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INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) decided over thirty government contracts or federal
procurement law cases in its 1990 term, each of which either affirmed, slightly expanded, or slightly retracted the court's existing
precedent.' The court's failure to break new or dramatic grounds
this term is not surprising, given that most principles of government
contract law are well-established. The Federal Circuit did, however,
reemphasize and reaffirm several policies and precedents relating to
standards of review, 2 contract interpretation, 3 standing,4 and jurisdiction. 5 Under standards of review, for example, the court continued to read statutory language strictly, according deference and full
effect to agency boards' factual conclusions while reviewing legal
condlusions de novo. 6 Under standing and jurisdiction, the Federal
Circuit restricted its jurisdiction, holding that exclusive jurisdiction
over maritime contract disputes lies exclusively with the federal dis1. The Federal Circuit issues published and unpublished opinions, both of which are

discussed in this article. Although the majority of the Federal Circuit's government contracts
opinions are unpublished, they still provide useful insight into the trends and thinking of the
court. Unpublished opinions, however, are not controlling authority. See United States v.
General Elec. Corp., 727 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nies,J., concurring) (admonishing counsel for citing unpublished decision of court as controlling authority regarding jurisdictional issue).
2. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text (examining Federal Circuit's standard
of review of agency Boards of Contract Appeals' decision).
3. See infra'notes 249-341 and accompanying text (reviewing cases involving interpretation of ambiguous contract provisions and termination for convenience clause).
4. See infra notes 9-33 and accompanying text (discussing "interested party"
requirement).
5. See infra notes 9-118 and accompanying text (examining jurisdictional decisions relating to agency Boards of Contract Appeals, Claims Court, and Federal Circuit).
6. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text (reviewing Federal Circuit standard of
review).
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trict courts.
In each case discussed here, the Federal Circuit relied on its past
holdings to fine-tune the legal doctrines involved. The first part of
this Article examines the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional decisions,
treating those relating to the Boards of Contract Appeals, the
Claims Court, and the Federal Circuit separately. The Article then
reviews procedural issues addressed by the Federal Circuit, including the standard of review of agency board's decisions. The next
two sections contain the court's constitutional analysis of the right
to jury trial in government contract cases and issues revolving
around bid protests. Finally, this Article concludes with an examination of the substantive issues of contract formation, including
contract interpretation and the question of the existence of an implied contract between the government and third-party sureties.
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS

A. Jurisdictionof GSBCA over Bid Protests
1.

"Interestedparty" requirement

The Federal Circuit handed down one decision in 1990, Federal
Data Corp. v. United States,8 defining the "interested party" requirement for filing a bid protest with the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA).9 Consistent with its 1989
trend, the court continued to narrow the grounds for standing to
bring a bid protest at the GSBCA. 10 In FederalData Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a bidder who has withdrawn from the bid by
refusing to renegotiate is not an "interested party," and is not entitled to file a protest with GSBCA. 1 '
Federal Data Corporation and nine other vendors submitted bids
on a request for proposals for automatic data processing equipment
for the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 12 The bid was
7. See infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's analysis
that limited its subject matter jurisdiction by deferring to congressional intent).
8. 911 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
9. Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 703-05 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Under
the Brooks Act, Pub. L. No. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.
§ 759 (1988)), the GSBCA may hear protests filed by "interested parties." 40 U.S.C.
§ 759(0(1) (1988). The Brooks Act defines an interested party as "an actual or prospective
bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract." 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(9)(B).
10. See Younger, The Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit During
1989, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 1007, 1010-14 (1990) (noting that Federal Circuit defined "interested
party" as too narrow a ground for standing in 1989 decisions and examining cases).
11. Federal Data Corp., 911 F.2d at 703-05.
12. Id. at 701.
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awarded to International Business Machines (IBM) and HCFA notified the unsuccessful bidders of the award.' 3 The notification included previously withheld technical information regarding IBM's

proposal. 14
Wang, another bidder, timely protested the award to IBM and in
response, HCFA suspended performance of the contract. 15 HCFA
announced that it would reopen the negotiations, advising all previous unsuccessful bidders that HCFA would provide each vendor
with technical information similar to the information that had been
released to IBM in order to place all prospective vendors on an
equal footing.16 The contracting officer chose to renegotiate rather
than to reprocure because of HCFA's critical need for the ADP
7
equipment.'
Federal Data did not agree to the terms set out by the contracting
officer and protested twice to the GSBCA.1 8 During its second protest, Federal Data stated that it would not enter or participate in the
renegotiation. 19 HCFA confirmed by letter that Federal Data's
prices and technical scores would not be released to other bidders
due to Federal Data's decision not to participate in the
20
renegotiation.
Federal Data subsequently amended its second protest, contending that HCFA proposed an improper remedy to correct the errors
of the first solicitation. 2 ' Again, Federal Data stipulated that it
would not compete further in the renegotiation process.2 2 The
GSBCA dismissed or denied each of Federal Data's protest counts
23
and Federal Data appealed to the Federal Circuit.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Wang contended that HCFA disclosed incorrect information regarding its assessment ofthe initial proposals submitted by each vendor. Id. HHS acknowledged that its investigation revealed that HGFA unintentionally conveyed inaccurate information to all vendors.
Id.
16. Id. The information disclosed included the identity of all offerors in the competitive
range, the total evaluated prices of all offerors, and the total technical score of all offerors. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Federal Data's first protest, seeking suspension of delegation of procurement
authority and reimbursement of proposal costs, protest costs, and attorneys' fees as relief for
errors in the original solicitation, was dismissed without prejudice upon agreement by the
parties. Id. In deciding not to renegotiate, Federal Data maintained that it had submitted its
best and final offer, and that recompetition would not result in a more favorable evaluation.
Id.
20. Id. at 701-02. Each bidder had the option not to participate in the renegotiation, and
bidders who chose not to participate did not have any of their bid information released. Id.
21. Id. at 702.
22. Id.
23. FederalData Corp., GSBCA No. 9732-P, 89-1 BCA (CCH) 21,414 at 107,924 (1988),
aff'd, 911 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether Federal Data
had standing to pursue a protest when it did not participate in the
renegotiation of the award. 24 The court stated that a protest could
only be filed by an "interested party" and that there are two elements to this statutory requirement: (1) the protestor must be an
"actual or prospective bidder"; and (2) there must be a "direct economic interest" that would be affected by the award of a contract or
the failure to award the contract. 25 In interpreting the requirements, the court held that the GSBCA's "protest authority does not
extend to disappointed bidders who have no chance of receiving the
contract."' 26 Relying on United States v. International Business Machines,2 7 the court held that the GSBCA's jurisdiction is limited to
protests brought by bidders who are in a position to receive the
challenged award. 28 When Federal Data voluntarily removed itself
from the renegotiation, it was no longer in a position to receive the
contract from HCFA/HHS and, therefore, could not have been a
"prospective bidder." 29
The court also stated that Federal Data's expressed intention to
compete in a future solicitation, if the GSBCA found the government's conduct unlawful, was not sufficient to grant Federal Data
"interested party" status.3 0 Relying on MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. United States,3 1 the court held that "[a] stated intention to submit a
proposal in response to any resolicitation, and its efforts to secure
resolicitation by filing a protest, does nothing to create the necessary interested party status." 3 2 The Federal Circuit wrote that a
speculative prospect that a solicitation will be canceled and a new
solicitation initiated does not grant "interested party" status to a
33
possible bidder.
The Federal Circuit's holding in FederalData Corp., in heightening
the standing requirement for a GSBCA bid protest, confirms its current approach of narrowly construing the "interested party"
requirement.
24.

Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 701-02 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

25.

Id. at 703.

26.
27.

Id.
892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that only low, responsive, and disappointed

bidder had standing).
28. FederalDataCorp., 911 F.2d at 703-04.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 704.
31. 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that would-be protestor, who had not submitted proposal but sought resolicitation of agency requirements, was not "interested party").
32. Federal Data Corp., 911 F.2d at 704 (quoting MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
United States, 878 F.2d 362, 365 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
33. Federal Data Corp., 911 F.2d at 704.
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Protests involving the Warner Amendment

In Electronic Systems Associates v. United States,3 4 the Federal Circuit
considered the reach of the Warner Amendment in GSBCA bid protests. 3 5 The court held that a Reduced Instruction Set Computer
Ada Environment (RISCAE) intended to be used in the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) systems was a "weapon" for purposes of the
Warner Amendment and, as such, deprives the GSBCA of jurisdiction over challenges to awards of weapons contracts. 36 The plaintiff, Electronic Systems, responded to an Air Force solicitation
seeking a RISCAE for radiation-hardened microprocessors.3 7
The government chose to procure the system through a small
business set-aside to which Electronic Systems protested.3 8 The
GSBCA held that the RISCAE was a "weapon" or "weapon system"
within the rubric of the Warner Amendment and not standard Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment.3 9 Accordingly, the
40
GSBCA dismissed the protest for lack of jurisdiction.
The central issue on appeal was whether the GSBCA had jurisdiction over the protest under the Brooks Act or whether the Warner
Amendment operated to deprive the GSBCA of its jurisdiction. 4 ' In
a unanimous opinion written by Judge Mayer, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the GSBCA's dismissal. 4 2 Relying on exemptions (iv) and
(v) of the Warner Amendment, the court agreed with the Board's
conclusion that the RISCAE was an "integral part of the weapon or
weapons system" and therefore not under the Brooks Act ADP
34.
35.

895 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Electronic Sys. Assoc. v. United States, 895 F.2d 1398, 1400-02 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

The Warner Amendment excludes from the coverage of the Brooks Act:
The procurement by the Department of Defense of automatic data processing equipment or services if the function, operation, or use of which (i) involves intelligence activities;
(ii) involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(iii) involves command and control of military forces;
(iv) involves equipment which is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system;
or
(v) is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions, provided
that this exclusion shall not include automatic data processing equipment
used for routine administrative and business applications such as payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management.
40 U.S.C. § 759(a)(3)(C) (1988).
36. ElectronicSys. Assoc., 895 F.2d at 1400.
37. Id. at 1399.
38. Id.
39. Id. (finding that ADP equipment is weapon because it is "critical to direct fulfillment
of military or intelligence missions").
21,759 at 109,505
40. Electronic Sys. Assoc., GSBCA No. 9966-P, 89-2 BCA (CCH)
(1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
41. Electronic Sys. Assoc., 895 F.2d at 1400; see also supra note 35 (stating relevant provisions of Warner Amendment).
42. Id.
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equipment jurisdiction. 43
The Federal Circuit, relying on findings of undisputed facts,

found a real and convincing nexus between the contract and the fulfillment of a military mission. 44 The court concluded that the pro-

curement in question was "critical to the direct fulfillment of
military or intelligence missions," and not subject to the Brooks
Act.4s
The court also held that the GSBCA's jurisdiction was limited to
the express provisions of the Brooks Act and not to extraneous
sources such as treaties or other statutory authorities. 4 6 The court
rejected Electronic System's argument that, in determining if the
GSBCA has jurisdiction under the Brooks Act, it must consider the
impact of that determination on other laws or agreements, such as
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and
the Soviet Union. 47 Because the Act specifically limits the grant of
GSBCA jurisdiction to ADP equipment procurements, which include bid protests over Department of Defense procurements of
ADPE crucial to military missions, the Board properly dismissed the
appeal. 48 In addition, the court emphasized statutory construction,
reiterating that a court is compelled to give the words of a statute
their plain and ordinary meaning unless there is a clear congressional intent to the contrary. 49 Because neither the Brooks Act nor
its legislative history indicates an intent contrary to the plain language of the statute, the Federal Circuit found that the GSBCA's
jurisdiction was clearly delineated. 50
43.

Id.

44. Id. at 1401.
45.

Id. at 1402.

46. Id. at 1400.
47. Id. (providing three reasons for rejecting Electronic Systems' reliance on ABM
Treaty). First, the ABM Treaty predates the Warner Amendment and the SDI program by at
least nine years; second, the ABM Treaty neither uses nor defines the terms "weapon" or
"weapons systems"; and third, the Warner Amendment does not refer to the ABM Treaty. Id.
As a result, the court concluded that the ABM Treaty is "irrelevant to the jurisdictional analysis." Id.
48. Id. at 1402. See PacifiCorporation Capital v. United States, 852 F.2d 549, 551 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (denying GSBCA jurisdiction over Department of Defense ADPE procurements if
essential to accomplishing military mission).
49. Electronic Sys. Assoc., 895 F.2d at 1400 (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422,
1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, No. 90-5017 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file) (emphasizing that statutory language will
not be construed contrary to plain meaning absent contrary intent in legislative history). The
full text of this opinion was originally cited at 910 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1990), but was withdrawn to correct errors.
50. Electronic Sys. Assoc., 895 F.2d at 1400.
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II.

JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT

A. Jurisdictionover Final Contracting Officer Decisions
The Federal Circuit in Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States,5'
discussed the jurisdiction of the Claims Court and the issue of finality of board decisions, reinforcing its strict construction of jurisdic52
tional statutes.
Placeway Construction brought an action under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA)5 3 to recover amounts withheld by the government,
adjustments, and cost performance increases.5 4 The contracting officer denied Placeway's claims and Placeway brought suit in the
United States Claims Court. 55 The Claims Court held that the decision of the contracting officer was not final because the contracting
officer had not determined the amount of the set-off.5 6 Upon the
government's motion, the Claims Court dismissed the suit and
57
Placeway appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the Claims Court. 58 Reviewing the Claims
Court's jurisdiction over final decisions, the court held that final decisions are those which are adjudicated completely, resolving issues
of both liability and damages. 5 9 The Federal Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Michel, stated that the contracting officer's decision held Placeway liable due to its delayed performance and the
officer ruled that damages would be the contract balance, subject to
51. No. 90-5017 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file).
52. Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, No. 90-5017, at 14-25 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file).
53. The Contract Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1982) (codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988)), provides for concurrent jurisdiction over government contract
claims between the Claims Court and the boards of contract appeals. 41 U.S.C. §§ 606,
609(a)(1) (1988). Section 605(a) requires that the contracting officers reach a final decision
regarding a claim and that they furnish a copy of their decisions to the contractor, stating the
reasons for the decision reached. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988).
54. Placeway Constr. Corp., No. 90-5017, at 10-12. Placeway submitted a claim for
$297,226.12 due on the contract, a claim for $287,047.89 for 31 additional work claims, and a
claim of $119,585.91 for extended overhead expenses. Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 159, 161 (1989).
55. Placeway Constr. Corp., 18 Cl. Ct. at 161-62.
56. Id. at 164-65.
57. Id. at 168. Placeway first filed a motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to U.S.
Claims Court Rules 59 and 60(b), which were denied by the Claims Court. Placeway Constr.
Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 484, 485 (1990) (citing ClAiMS CT. R. 59 & 60(b)).
58. Placeway Constr. Corp., No. 90-5017, at 18. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims
Court's dismissal of plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment, noting that the Claims Court
may grant equitable relief only in limited circumstances. Id. at 4-5 (citing provision at 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1988) (limiting Claims Court's authority to grant declaratory judgments
to cases where contract claim is filed before contract is awarded)).
59. Placeway Constr. Corp., No. 90-5017, at 7.
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some possible revision. 60 The court relied on Teller Environmental
Systems v. United States, 61 which held that a contracting officer's decision must completely adjudicate all rights, including issues of liability and damages in order to be final. 62 Applying this principle, the
Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court possesses jurisdiction to
review a contracting officer's decision in Placeway-type situations. 63
B. Jurisdiction over Claims Based on the Prompt Payment Act
In New York GuardianMortgagee Corp. v. United States,64 the Federal
Circuit considered whether a federal contract must exist before a
claim can be submitted under the Prompt Payment Act. 65 New York
Guardian acquired seventy-six defaulted mortgages that were guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA). 6 6 New York Guardian
conveyed the property to the VA and awaited payment. 6 7 The VA
delayed payment and New York Guardian sued in the United States
Claims Court seeking interest on the delayed payments under the
Prompt Payment Act.6 8 The Claims Court dismissed the suit, holding that a federal contract is required for a party to make a claim
60. Id. (observing that contracting officer decided that Placeway's failure to complete
project in timely manner caused government to delay issuing notices to proceed to other
contractors, giving rise to potential government liability to other contractors). The court held
that a subsequent decision that Placeway owed the government more or less than the contract
balance due to these delays would not affect the finality of the contracting officer's decision.
Id.
61. 802 F.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A Teller employee caused damage to a Navy installation where Teller was performing its contract. See Teller Envtl. Sys. v. United States, 802
F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (observing that although Teller repaired damage, defects
subsequently developed and that Navy refused to pay balance of contract price until liability

for correcting defects was determined).
62. Id. at 1388-89 (finding that contracting officer's decision was final because issues of
liability and damages had been resolved, but Board's decision was not final because it remanded case to parties to resolve amount of each party's liability for damages).
63.

Placeway Constr. Corp., No. 90-5017, at 14.

64. 916 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
65. New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. United States, 916 F.2d 1558, 1559-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). The Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3907(a) (1988), provides for the
payment of interest on late payments as follows:
[T]he head of an agency acquiring property or service from a business concern, who
does not pay the concern for each complete delivered item of property or service by
the required payment date, shall pay an interest penalty to the concern on the
amount of payment due.
31 U.S.C. § 3902(a) (1988).
66. New York GuardianMortgagee Corp., 916 F.2d at 1559.

67. Guardian was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sales after the properties securing the mortgages were foreclosed. Id. The property was conveyed to the Veterans' Administration pursuant to the Veterans' Benefits and Services Act of 1988 which provides: "if
the holding of the defaulted loan acquires the property securing the loan at a liquidation sale
... the holder shall have the option to convey the property to the United States in return for
payment by the Administrator .. " 38 U.S.C. § 1832(c)(5)(A) (1988).
68. New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp., 916 F.2d at 1559.
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under the Prompt Payment Act. 6 9 The court found that, because
the government had acquired the property through a purely statutory scheme, no federal contract existed, and, therefore, the Prompt
70
Payment Act did not apply.
In a unanimous opinion written by SeniorJudge Cowen, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court's decision. 7 1 The Federal
Circuit found that there is no provision in the Prompt Payment Act
that authorizes the recovery of interest under the Veterans Loan
Program and, therefore, the regulations governing the application
of the Act control. 7 2 The court agreed with the Claims Court that
the implementing regulations did not define the type of transaction
involved in New York Guardian as a "federal contract." ' 73 Moreover,
the court held that the regulations show that the Prompt Payment
Act applies only to the government's acquisition of goods and services by written contract.7 4 The Federal Circuit found that no written
contract existed between New York Guardian and the VA and none
was required to complete the acquisition because all obligations and
transfers were based on purely statutory authority. 75 Therefore, the
court concluded that there could be no application of the Act without a federal contract. 7 6 Absent a specific statutory authorization,
the government could not be charged interest unless liability for the
interest is "clearly imposed by statute or assumed by contract. ' 77

III.

JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A. Jurisdictionover FinalAgency Boards' Decisions
Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act, 78 the Federal Circuit
hears appeals from the United States Claims Court and the Boards
of Contract Appeals. The Federal Circuit's decision in Teledyne Continental Motors v. United States 79 clarifies its definition of a board's "fi69. New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. United States, No. 766-87C (Cl. Ct. Nov. 8,
1989) (order), aft'd, 916 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
70.
71.

New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp., 916 F.2d at 1559.
Id.

72. Id. at 1559-60.
73. Id. at 1560.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id

77. Id. (citing Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 353 (1937); United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (CI. Ct. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 911 (1976)).
78. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C. (1988)) (creating Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and empowering it to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over patent, government contracts, merit system protection, tax,
trademark, and international trade cases).
79. 906 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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nal" decision8 o for purposes of appealability, without necessarily
expanding or narrowing its jurisdiction. Teledyne Continental, a
manufacturer of tank and airplane engines f6r military and industrial applications, was reimbursed by the government under government contracts for pension costs allocable to work performed under
those contracts. 8 The general accounting method applied to these
allocations was governed by Cost Accounting Standards. 2 During
an audit, the administrative contracting officer advised Teledyne
Continental that its accounting system did not comply with iterated
83

standards.
Teledyne Continental challenged the decision of the contracting
officer.8 4 Upon denial of its challenge, Teledyne Continental appealed this decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), which denied in part, sustained in part, and
remanded the decision to the contracting officer.8 5 Teledyne Conti86
nental then appealed the ASBCA's decision to the Federal Circuit.
The narrow issue presented on appeal was whether the ASBCA's
decision was final for purposes of vesting jurisdiction in the Federal
Circuit.8 7 The court defined a final decision as one which "ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute thejudgment."8 8 A litigant must raise all issues or claims of
error in one appeal following a decision on the merits.8 9 Based on
this definition, a decision limited to the issue of liability, where the
assessment of damages or other relief remains open, is not final. 90
Applying this concept to the finality of board decisions, a court
must examine the scope and extent of the contracting officer's deci80. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction only over a final decision of an agency board of
contract appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (1988); see supra notes 51-63 and accompanying
text (examining issue of finality of board decisions in context of Claims Court jurisdiction).
81. Teledyne Continental Motors v. United States, 906 F.2d 1579, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
82. Id. at 1580-81. The applicable Cost Accounting Standards were CAS 403 and CAS
413. Section 403 governs the allocation of home office expenses to segments. 4 C.F.R. § 403
(1990). Section 413 concerns adjustment and allocation of pension cost. 4 C.F.R. § 413
(1990).
83. Teledyne ContinentalMotors, 906 F.2d at 1580 (noting that Teledyne did not calculate
pension costs separately for its divisions).
84. Id. (arguing that "active employee head count" method it used correctly allocated
pension costs).
85. Teledyne Continental Motors, ASBCA No. 24,738, 89-2 BCA (CCH) 21,780 (1989),
appeal dismissed, 906 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
86. Teledyne ContinentalMotors, 906 F.2d at 1580.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)).
89. Teledyne ContinentalMotors, 906 F.2d at 1581-82.
90. Id. at 1582; see also Liberty Mutual Ins. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (stating
that grant of partial summary judgment, without decisions on damages, is interlocutory).
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sion. 9 l In Teledyne Continental, the contracting officer had decided
both the issue of liability and the amount of damage that Teledyne
Continental owed the government.9 2 The ASBCA, however, had affirmed the contracting officer's decision of noncompliance with the
Cost Accounting Standards but had made no decision regarding
93
whether Teledyne Continental owed money to the government.
Thus, the ASBCA's decision did not dispose of both the issues of
liability and damages or other relief. Jurisdiction, therefore, did not
94
vest with the Federal Circuit.
Teledyne Continental argued that because both parties stipulated
the issues on appeal, the court could assert jurisdiction.9 5 The court
noted, however, that consent of both parties to a suit cannot cure a
defect in jurisdiction.9 6 On all grounds, therefore, the appeal was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, thereby clarifying the final decision requirement for the purpose of appeals of boards of contract
97
decisions to the Federal Circuit.
B. Jurisdictionover Maritime Contracts
Although the concepts discussed are not new, Southwest Marine v.
United States98 represents an important jurisdictional decision by the
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit held that exclusive jurisdiction
over maritime contract disputes lies exclusively with the federal district courts and not with the Federal Circuit.9 9 In so holding, the
court limited its own subject matter jurisdiction.
Southwest Marine bid and received a contract with the United
States Navy for ship repair. 10 0 During the course of performance,
several contract modifications were made for which Southwest
Marine requested payment adjustments. 10 1 The contracting officer
denied Southwest Marine's request, and the contractor appealed to
91. Teledyne Continental Motors, 906 F.2d at 1582.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that because parties settled, no controversy exists and court was therefore without
jurisdiction).
97. Id. at 1583-84.
98. 896 F.2d 532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
99. See Southwest Marine v. United States, 896 F.2d 532, 535 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that Congress' formation of Federal Circuit was not intended to change jurisdiction over maritime contract disputes); see also Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 356
(1932) (vesting district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over maritime contracts),
100. Southwest Marine, 896 F.2d at 532-33.

101.

Id.
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the ASBCA.1 0 2 The ASBCA upheld the contracting officer's decision and Southwest Marine appealed to the Federal Circuit. 10 3 On
appeal, the government sought dismissal due to lack of Federal Cir10 4
cuit jurisdiction over maritime contracts.
Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act, the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals taken from the boards of contract appeals.' 0 5 However, Section 603 of the Contract Disputes Act
restricts the avenue of review for contracts "arising out of maritime
06

contracts."1
Southwest Marine argued that while the language of Section 603
appears to restrict jurisdiction to federal district courts, such a restriction does not apply to the Federal Courts Improvement Act because no section in that Act refers to such a restriction.1 0 7 The
court disagreed. Judge Newman, writing for a unanimous panel,
stated that the legislative history of the statutes strongly indicates
that maritime contracts were to be excluded from the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.108
Southwest Marine also argued that subsequent statutes, which
contradict earlier statutes, govern.' 0 9 The court noted, however,
that even if Southwest Marine were correct, that a later statute implicitly supersedes an earlier inconsistent statute, the intent of Con102. Southwest Marine, ASBCA No. 33,404, 89-1 BCA (CCH) 21,425 (1988).
103. Southwest Marine, 896 F.2d at 533.
104. Id. at 533-34.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (1988). Under this section, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review "an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of contract appeals pursuant to section [607](g)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10)
(1988). According to the jurisdictional statute, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals taken under section 6 07(g). Section 607(g)(1) provides:
(1) The decision of an agency board of contract appeals shall be final, except that (A) a contractor may appeal such a decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within one hundred twenty days after the date
of receipt of a copy of such decision, or
(B) the agency head, if he determines that an appeal should be taken, and with
the prior approval of the Attorney General, transmits the decision of the
board of contract appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
for judicial review under section 1295 of title 28, within one hundred and
twenty days from the date of the agency's receipt of a copy of the board's
decision.
41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1) (1988).
106. 41 U.S.C. § 603 (1988). Section 603 provides in pertinent part: "Appeals under
paragraph (g) of section 607 of this title and suits under section 609 of this title, arising out of
maritime contracts, shall be governed by chapter 20 [the Suites in Admiralty Act] or 22 [Public Vessels Act] of Title 46 as applicable .
J..."
jurisdiction vests in the federal district courts
when either chapter 20 or 22 is involved. 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 782 (1988).
107. Southwest Marine, 896 F.2d at 533.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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gress must nonetheless be clear that the later statute controls."l 0
Relying on United States v. United Continental Tuna,' 1' Judge Newman
wrote that "a cardinal principle of statutory construction ...is that
repeals by implication are not favored." ' 12 Implicit repeal is looked
upon with disfavor, especially when a general statute appears to supersede a more specific statute. 1 13 Only in rare circumstances,
114
therefore, will such implicit repeals be upheld.
The court also noted that jurisdiction over maritime contracts has
traditionally vested in the federal district courts.1 1 5 The Federal
Courts Improvement Act did not change that jurisdiction nor did
Congress demonstrate an intent to do so.116 The court reasoned
that because the maritime nature of the existing contract was not at
issue, some clear evidence rebutting the presumption that jurisdiction over maritime contracts lies with the federal district courts must
exist in order to vest the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over
Southwest Marine's contract. 1 7 The court concluded that, without
an indication from Congress that the Federal Courts Improvement
Act supersedes section 603 of the Contract Disputes Act, jurisdiction lies with the federal district courts and not with the Federal
Circuit. 118

Judge Newman's opinion represents an extremely lucid account
of jurisdictional and statutory construction. It is therefore instructive for its views to the extent that it reaffirms the strict construction
of the Federal Circuit's subject matter jurisdiction.
IV.

A.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Federal Circuit Standard of Review of Boards of Contract
Appeals' Decisions

The Federal Circuit standard of review of agency board's deci110. Id. Section 603 of the Contract Disputes Act was enacted in 1978. The Federal
Courts Improvement Act was passed in 1982.
111. 425 U.S. 164 (1976). The case involved a Filipino shipping vessel that was damaged
in a collision with a United States naval destroyer. United States v. United Continental Tuna,
425 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1976). The Supreme Court held that the claim was governed by the
Public Vessels Act, and thus, the claim was subject to the Act's reciprocity provision. Id. at
182.
112. Southwest Marine, 896 F.2d at 533 (citing United Continental Tuna, 425 U.S. at 168).
113. Id.
114. See id. (observing that legislative history will rarely guide court to statutory interpretation at variance with plain words of statute).
115. Id. at 534; see also Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 356 (1932)
(vesting district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over maritime contracts).
116. Southwest Marine, 896 F.2d at 534.
117. Id. at 535.
118. Id.
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sions is statutorily defined by the Contract Disputes Act. 1 19 In its

1990 decisions, the Federal Circuit continued to interpret the statutory standard strictly, according deference and full effect to agency

boards of contract appeal's factual conclusions, while reviewing
legal conclusions de novo.
In Halifax Engineering v. United States, 120 the Federal Circuit affirmed a GSBCA decision upholding a contracting officer's termination of a contract.1 21 Although the case adds little to existing

government contracts theory, it is noteworthy because the court reaffirmed its ruling that questions of contract interpretation are ques-

tions of law, and, therefore, a board's decision on the legal
interpretation of a contract is not final.1 22 Factual findings, how-

ever, will not be set aside unless appellants show that they are fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, grossly erroneous, or not supported by
23
substantial evidence.
Halifax Engineering was awarded a contract to provide security
guard services for the Department of State.' 2 4 Prior to beginning

actual performance, Halifax was asked to correct deficiencies in its
projected performance and was given ten days to do so after which
the government terminated the contract.1 25 Halifax asserted that
the cure notice provided was deficient and that default termination

was therefore improper.

26

The Federal Circuit affirmed the termi-

nation, stating that the clear language of the contract requires that
the government only allow Halifax ten days from receipt of the no-

tice to cure deficiencies.1 27 Because the analysis involved a legal in119. 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988). This statute governs the standard of review for the Federal Circuit of both factual and legal conclusions. It provides in pertinent part:
mhe decision of the agency board on any question of law shall not be final or conclusive, but the decision on any question of fact shall be final and conclusive and
shall not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, or arbitrary, or capricious, or
so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or if such decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988).
120. 915 F.2d 689 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
121. Halifax Eng'g v. United States, 915 F.2d 689, 691 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
122. See id. at 690 (quoting Alvin, Ltd. v. United States Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 1562, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (reversing Postal Service Board's holding that Postal Service was not obligated to pay certain California taxes under existing lease agreements)).
123. Id.
124. Id. The contract gave the government the option to terminate the contract for default if, after notifying Halifax of deficiencies, and allowing ten days to cure, the government
found the deficiencies not cured. Id.
125. Id. The government set a new contract starting date and informed Halifax that failure to perform would result in termination. Id. Termination resulted due to Halifax's failure
to be prepared to begin performance on the start date. Id.
126. Id. at 691. Halifax charged that the government's letter was legally inadequate because it failed to specify defects and a cure period. Id.
127. Id. at 690.
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terpretation of a contract provision, the Federal Circuit reviewed
the GSBCA's interpretation de novo and held that the cure request
128
was sufficient notice under the terms of the contract.
The Federal Circuit's reaffirmation of its standard of review of an
agency board's decision occurs consistently throughout the court's
opinions. 12 9 The standard of review is statutorily mandated under
the Contracts Disputes Act.13 0 Therefore, because the language and
legislative history are clear, the Federal Circuit has little discretion
in interpreting the standard.
B.

Review of Claims: Form over Substance

The Federal Circuit, in Placeway Construction Corp. v. United
States,' 3 1 held clearly thatform will never define the terms of a claim
over the claim's substance.'3 2 The Federal Circuit held that the
claims court erred when it found that Placeway improperly fragmented its request for compensation for additional work into individual items because it originally presented its claim to the
contracting officer in one lump sum.13 3 The court noted that the
form in which a claim is presented does not determine whether a
claim is unitary; rather, the court must conduct a fact finding to determine whether the claims arise from a common set of operative
34

facts. 1

The court cited its prior holding in ContractCleaning Maintenance v.
United States '3 5 which supports this view. The court in ContractClean128. Id. at 691. The Federal Circuit affirmed the GSBCA's finding that the government
letter was proper notice. Halfax Eng'g, GSBCA No. 8173, 89-3 BCA (CCH)
21,926 at
22,610 (1989).
129. See, e.g., Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(reaffirming standard of review of agency board decisions as factual findings being final unless
fraudulent, arbitrary, or grossly erroneous, while legal conclusions are freely reviewable de
novo); Fruin-Conlon Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1427, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating
standard of review in reviewing ASBCA decision regarding contract interpretation dispute);
R.B. Wright Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 90-1188, at 6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Circuit file) (noting that although questions of contract interpretation are
questions of law reviewable de novo, ASBCA's expertise should be accorded some weight);
SMS Data Prod. Group v. United States, 900 F.2d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reviewing
standard of review).
130. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining pertinent provision in Contract
Disputes Act).
131. No. 90-5017 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file). See supra
notes 52-63 and accompanying text (explaining facts and holding of Placeway Consir. Corp.).
132. Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, No. 90-5017, at 13-14 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 15.
135. 811 F.2d 586 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's dismissal of the contractor's claim for over $99,000 for lack of certification where the claim represented various amounts accruing over several years. Contract Cleaning Maintenance v.
United States, 811 F.2d 586, 589, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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ing stated: "[i]t is the claim presented to the contracting officer that
is determinative. . ., not the format or fragmentation set forth in the
complaint . ...
136 The court was consistent in applying its prior
precedent and in clarifying its principles.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

A.

Right to Jury Trial

Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States1 37 represents the Federal Circuit's 1990 foray into questions of constitutional law in government
contracts. The issue in Seaboard Lumber was whether a government
contractor is entitled to an article III court or jury trial for the adjudication of its claims and the government's counterclaims.' 3 8 The
case affirms the constitutionality of the Contract Disputes Act's
(CDA) adjudication provisions and defines the scope of a govern39
ment contractor's waiver of its rights.
Several timber companies, known collectively as "Seaboard,"
which individually entered into timber sales contracts with the government, challenged the contracting officer's decision that they were
in breach of their individual contracts with the government.140 Each
contract contained a disputes provision, subjecting disputes resolution to the terms of the CDA.14 1 The government counterclaimed
for breach of contract.' 42 Seaboard claimed the CDA, as incorporated into the government's contract, unconstitutionally deprived
them of either their right to a trial before an article III court or
43
before a jury on the counterclaims presented by the government.
136. Id. at 591. The Federal Circuit also stated:
We know of no requirement in the Disputes Act that a "claim" must be submitted in
any particular form or use any particular wording. All that is required is ...a clear
and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the
basis and amount of the claim.
137. 903 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Seaboard Lumber filed a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court on December 10, 1990. In its petition, Seaboard attacked the constitutionality of the Contract Disputes Act by arguing that Congress illegally delegated jurisdiction
to the Claims Court over cases traditionally and more appropriately reviewed by article III
courts. No. 90-964 (U.S. filed Dec. 10, 1990).
138. Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
139. Id. at 1568. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining Contract Disputes
Act).
140. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1561.
141. Id. The relevant provisions of the CDA provide that a contracting officer's final decision cannot be judicially challenged unless the contractor appeals within 90 days to the appropriate board of contract appeals or files a direct access suit in the Claims Court. 41 U.S.C.
§§ 606, 609(a)(3) (1988).
142. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1562.
143. Id. at 1561.
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The Claims Court rejected these constitutional arguments. 144
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that Seaboard waived its
rights to an article IIIjury trial and that the CDA did not unconstitutionally deprive Seaboard of its right to either an article III court or
a jury trial. 14 5 Writing for a unanimous court, ChiefJudge Nies reviewed the requirements of the seventh amendment and Supreme
Court case law. 14 6 The court stated that while the seventh amendment provides that private litigants have a right to a jury trial for
controversies exceeding twenty dollars, 14 7 the Supreme Court has
recognized a litigant's choice to waive that right as well as the right
to an article III court. 14 8 The waiver can be either express or implied, requiring only that the party waiving its right do so voluntarily
and knowingly, based on the facts presented in each case.149
The Federal Circuit noted that waiver of certain enumerated
rights has been standard practice in government contracts for many
years. 150 Government contractors have long been bound by contract clauses vesting dispute resolution in a nonjury, non-article III
forum. 15 1 This acceptance of the contract provision that provided
for dispute resolution can be construed as a voluntary and knowing
144. 15 Cl. Ct. 366 (1988), aff'd, 903 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
145. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1568.
146. Id at 1561.
147. Id, at 1563 (quoting seventh amendment).
148. Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trade Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)).
In Schor, the Supreme Court noted that article III, section 1 seeks to protect the role of the
independent judiciary and to safeguard a litigant's right to adjudicate claims before judges
who are not dominated by the other branches of government. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (stating article III
vests federal judicial power in courts whose judges have life tenure and fixed compensation to
ensure independent judiciary and impartial adjudication in federal courts)); United States v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980) (noting longstanding Anglo-American tradition of independent judiciary promoted by lifetime tenure and fixed compensation). In Schor, the Court noted
that this guarantee protects personal rights and may, therefore, be waived just as many other
personal constitutional rights. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
149. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1563 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1966) (holding petitioner's right to plead not guilty and confront and cross-examine witnesses could not be waived by counsel without his consent)). In Brookhart, the Supreme Court
specifically addressed the petitioner's right to waive his sixth amendment right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 2-3. The Court noted that there is a
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights and for a waiver to be effective "it
must be clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.'" Id. at 4 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(holding waiver of sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel must be intelligent one)).
150. SeaboardLumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1564 (noting that for many years, government regularly provided in contracts that contracting officer's final decision was not subject to review in
any judicial forum).
151. Id. (citing United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 460-62 (1950)). In Moorman, the
Supreme Court upheld a contractual provision making the decisions of the Secretary of War
final. Moorman, 338 U.S. at 463. The Supreme Court observed that the provision was not
ambiguous and that parties competent to enter into contracts are also competent to enter
agreements containing such provision. Id. at 461, 463.
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waiver of a contractor's right to a jury trial. 152 The court observed
that Congress has long approved of this practice and has not modified it with any recent legislation. 153
The Federal Circuit additionally noted that Seaboard, in fact, exercised its own statutory forum choice by suing in the United States
Claims Court. 15 4 Its right to do so was expressly incorporated into
the contract provisions referencing the CDA and waiving sovereign
immunity on the government's part.' 55 Therefore, the court concluded, Seaboard could not avail itself of one advantageous aspect
of the Act or the contract and yet disclaim application of other
56
sections.'
Seaboard further argued that, even if its waiver was knowing, it
was not voluntary because government contracts are, by their nature, adhesion contracts.1 5 7 The Federal Circuit stated, however,
that the mere fact that the contracts are of a "take it or leave it"
nature is not the controlling issue. 15 8 Contractors are not compelled or coerced into making a contract with the government. 159
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Wunderlich v.
United States 16 0 in which the Court stated that the contract entered
into was a voluntary undertaking and that, as competent parties,
they contracted for the bargain obtained.' 6 1 The Federal Circuit
concluded that Wunderlich controls the determination of voluntari16 2
ness in SeaboardLumber.
The court found that Seaboard agreed to the contract terms outlining dispute resolution procedures which did not include a jury
trial or an article III court.' 65 Seaboard did not argue that it was
152. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1563. The CDA now requires that the provisions of
the contract specify that the contractor cannot judicially challenge a contracting officer's final
decision unless it files an appeal with the board of contract appeals or the Claims Court within
the statutory time frames. Id. at 1562, 1565.
153. Id. at 1565 (noting that Congress passed statutes, providing for limited judicial re-

view of contracting officer's decision and requiring appeal with Board of Contract Appeals or
Claims Court).
154. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1567.
155. Id. at 1566-67.
156. Id. at 1567.
157. Id. at 1564.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 342 U.S. 98, 99-100 (1951).
161. Wunderlich v. United States, 342 U.S. 98, 100 (1951) (reversing Claims Court holding that set aside dispute resolution by agency head where contractual provision made such
resolution final decision). The court reaffirmed that such decisions could only be judicially
reviewed where fraud was alleged. Id. at 100.
162. Seaboard Lumber Co., 903 F.2d at 1565 (noting that, as in Wunderlich, Seaboard voluntarily entered its contract with government and also agreed to contract provisions which specifically waived its right to jury trial).
163. Id.
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unaware that it would not have a jury trial for any of its claims.'6
Under the circumstances, the court concluded, Seaboard *was hard
pressed to assert a right that it had voluntarily and knowingly
waived.' 65 The court held that signing a contract with limited rights
of review establishes a prima facie voluntary and knowing waiver of
any right to dispute resolution except that specified in the contract. 16 6 Having sued under the provisions of the CDA, and having
invoked the procedures of the Act as agreed to in the contract, Seaboard waived its rights to alternate resolutions and could no longer
167
retract its knowing and voluntary waiver.
VI.

A.

BID PROTESTS

MathematicalImbalance

In SMS Data Products Group v. United States, 16 8 the Federal Circuit
held that the mathematical imbalance in a successful bidder's offer
must be material before acceptance of the bid can be prevented. 16 9
SMS Data Products Group (SMS) and Federal Data Corporation
(FDC) responded to solicitations by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to provide microcomputer hardware, software,
and support services to the federal judiciary for up to 108
months.170 The government awarded the contract to FDC, and SMS
17
protested to the GSBCA. '
SMS contended that FDC's offer was mathematically or materially
imbalanced such that acceptance of its bid was prohibited by the
solicitation and the applicable federal regulations. 172 The Federal
Circuit reviewed SMS's legal contention that FDC's offer was so
mathematically or materially imbalanced that it could not be ac164. Id. at 1565 n.9.
165. Id. at 1565.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1568.
168. 900 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
169. SMS Data Prod. Group v. United States, 900 F.2d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
170. Id. at 1554. Each of the offers was evaluated on the basis of four factors: cost, user
demonstration, support system capabilities, and corporate and contract management. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1555; see 41 C.F.R. § 201-32.205-2(g)(3)(d) (1989) (prohibiting fixed price option and requiring contract prices to reasonably represent value of bona fide fiscal year requirements). The Administrative Office of the United States Court's solicitation provision
provides that:
[the contract price must] reasonably represent the value of a bona fide fiscal year's
requirements, rather than representing to any extent a portion of any other fiscal
year's requirement ....
[I]f a determination is made that an offer does not meet
these criteria, that offer cannot be accepted for award.
Solicitation Provision, m.2.5 (quoted in SMS Data Prod. Group, 900 F.2d at 1555).
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cepted. 173 The court noted that mathematical imbalance exists if
"each bid item fails to carry its share of the cost of the work (or
supplies) plus the bidder's profit/overhead or if the bid is based
upon nominal prices for some items and enhanced prices for
others." 174 SMS contended that a mathematical imbalance alone violates the Administrative Office's solicitation provisions and applicable federal regulations. 175 The court concurred with the actual
language of the regulations, but held that not every imbalanced bid
need be rejected. 176 The mathematical imbalance must also be material before the bid must be rejected. 177
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the doctrine of material imbalance.178 The doctrine, used frequently by the boards of contract
appeals, applies when an award fails to "represent the lowest ultimate cost to the Government or the imbalance is such that it will
adversely affect the integrity of the competitive bidding system."' 79
Applying this concept to the facts at hand, the Federal Circuit deferred to the agency and GSBCA's decision that to award the contract to FDC was in the government's best interest.180
B.

Dismissal of Frivolous Claims

The Federal Circuit's holding in ViON Corp. v. United States'8 1provides a clearer definition of when a protest is deemed frivolous. The
173. Id. at 1557.
174. Id. at 1555 (quoting Storage Tech. Corp., GSBCA No. 9345-P, 88-2 BCA (CCH)
20,667, at 104,445 (1988)). The Federal Circuit further defined mathematical imbalance as
taking the form of explicit "separate charges" which occur if the price of an item is not proportional to its value, but includes part of another fiscal year's requirements. SMS Data Prod.
Group, 900 F.2d at 1555. Explicit separate charges are prohibited. Id.
175. SMS Data Prod. Group, 900 F.2d at 1555.
176. Id. at 1557 (finding FDC's mathematical imbalance to be harmless error). The court
also held that even assuming that SMS could prove mathematical imbalance, without a show
of material imbalance, the bid could be accepted. See id. (rejecting SMS's claim due to its
failure to prove material imbalance).
177. Id. at 1557.
178. Id. Material imbalance occurs when an award "fails to 'represent the lowest ultimate
cost to the Government or the imbalance is such that it will adversely affect the integrity of the
competitive bidding system.'" Id. (quoting Storage Tech. Corp., GSBCA No. 9345-P, 88-2 BCA
(CCH) V 20,667, at 104, 445 (1988)).
179. SMS Data Prod. Group, 900 F.2d 1557.
180. Id. Although the Board's decision is fully reviewable, the court will not disturb the
decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, no evidence of abuse of discretion was
presented. Id. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(reaffirming principle that decisions by Comptroller General are to be accorded deference);
Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 1986) (requiring
procurement officials to make decisions after taking into account Comptroller General's recommendations); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 445 F.2d 1289, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (allowing agency to follow Comptroller General's recommendations even if different from
contracting officer's original decision).
181. 906 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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United States Army solicited offers for the provision of central

processing units for the Information System Selection and Acquisitioning Agency. 18 2 ViON was not awarded the contract and filed a

protest with the GSBCA. l83 The GSBCA examined the issues
presented by ViON and dismissed the protest as frivolous.

84

ViON, challenging the dismissal, appealed to the Federal Circuit. 8 5
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by examining the statutory
definitions and requirements for establishing whether an appeal is
frivolous.' 86 Under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,187
the GSBCA may dismiss a protest which is "frivolous or which, on

its face, does not state a valid basis for protest."' 8 8 The GSBCA
interpreted this provision as allowing the Board to dismiss complaints based on claims that are not substantiated or that, for some

reason, "consciously interfere with or delay the Board's management of protest proceedings." 8 9 The GSBCA relied on the legislative history of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, which
provided the Board with the authority to avoid disruptions of legitimate procurements and to "especially ... prevent protest actions
taken in bad faith... ,,"190 The GSBCA dismissed ViON's protest as

frivolous, stating that its protest was not prosecuted in a fair fashion

and that ViON's motives in bringing the protest were not
genuine. 19 1

The Federal Circuit agreed with the GSBCA's determination that
the statute allows the board to handle protest proceedings expedi-

tiously so as to satisfy the goals of economic and efficient procurements.

92

In reviewing the GSBCA's decision, the court focused on

the issue of whether protester motivations are appropriate grounds
for dismissing a protest as frivolous. 93 Neither the legislative his182. ViON Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
183. Id.
184. 1ION Corp., GSBCA No. 10218-P-R, 90-I BCA (CCH) 22,548 at 22,548 (1989),
rev'd, 906 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
185. ViON Corp., 906 F.2d at 1565.

186.

Id.

187. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713(2), 98 Stat. 1175, 1182-83 (codified as amended at 40
U.S.C. § 759(f) (1988)) (vesting jurisdiction in General Services Administration Board of
Contract Appeals, concurred with General Accounting Office, to decide protests by disappointed bidders on federal contracts relating to procurement of automated data processing

equipment).
188. 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(4)(C) (providing that "[t]he board may dismiss a protest the
board determines is frivolous, or which, on its face, does not state a valid basis for protest").
189. ViON Corp., GSBCA No. 10218-P-R, 90-1 BCA (CCH) 22,548, at 113, 148 (1989).
190. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1431, reprnntedin 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 2119).
191. ViON Corp., 906 F.2d at 1566.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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tory nor the plain language of the statute defines the term "frivolous." The court noted that the legislative history is devoid of any
evidence of intent by Congress to define "frivolous" in any manner
other than its established meaning in other legal contexts. 194 After
analyzing several Federal Circuit and Supreme Court opinions and
treatises, the Federal Circuit held that a protest is frivolous when the
claims or appeals involve "legal points not arguable on their merits,
or those whose disposition is obvious."' 195
The court then reviewed the reasons for the GSBCA's dismissal of
ViON's protest. Because the GSBCA found ViON's motivations,
rather than the merits of its protest, questionable, the Federal Circuit held that the GSBCA improperly dismissed ViON's protest. 196
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that "[a] protest cannot
be dismissed as 'frivolous' unless the protest lacks an arguable basis
197
in fact or law."'
In eliminating improper motivation as a definition of a frivolous
protest, the Federal Circuit has moved closer to drawing a bright
line distinction in the law in order to clarify the scope and authority
of both the agency boards' and its own jurisdiction. This opinion
appears to reflect a trend in the court's government contract decisions toward defining issues and terms more precisely.
VII.

A.

CONTRACT FORMATION

Between the Government and Third-Party Sureties

In Ransom v. United States,19 8 the Federal Circuit found that neither
an express contract nor an implied-in-fact contract existed between
the government and Ransom, the surety, which could have been
breached by the government, and that, therefore, the government
owed no obligation to Ransom that it could have breached.' 99
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Galloway Farms v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Galloway Farms involved a claim for damages against the United States by farmers affected by
the grain embargo against the Soviet Union. Galloway Farms, 834 F.2d at 999. The Federal
Circuit held that the plaintiffs' substantive claims were frivolous. Id. at 1001; see also Greenberg v. Salas, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that nonfrivolous complaint cannot
be filed for improper purpose).
196. ViON Corp., 906 F.2d at 1566 (finding that GSBCA improperly dismissed ViON's protest because subjective motive is irrelevant to merits of issues presented). The court reversed
and remanded the case with instructions to the Board to reinstate the protest. Id. at 1568.
197. Id at 1568 (cautioning in footnote 4, however, that GSBCA's conclusion does not
mean that refusal to respond promptly and adequately to proper discovery requests might not
give rise to inference that protestor's case lacks merit because it does not have facts required
for arguable case).
198. 900 F.2d 242 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
199. Ransom v. United States, 900 F.2d 242, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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William Ransom and Robert Nesen, acting as sureties, provided a
bid bond and payment and performance bonds to the A. Marvin
Company, the lowest bidder on a contract with the United States Air
Force. 20 0 The contractor, A. Marvin Company, defaulted during
the performance of its construction contract with the government
and Ransom executed a takeover agreement to complete performance. 20 1 Ransom, asserting that its surety relationship with Marvin
automatically gave rise to a contract between it and the government,
submitted a claim for money damages for its costs in completing the
contract. 20 2 After the government's contracting officer denied its
claim, Ransom brought a Tucker Act 20 3 claim against the government in the United States Claims Court.20 4 The Claims Court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment. 20 5 Ransom appealed, contending that either an express or implied contract
20 6
existed between it and the government.
A unanimous panel, in an opinion written by Judge Michel, af200. Id
201. Id. The contractor's bid was $1.7 million lower than the government's estimate of
performance cost plus profit. Id After the government sought confirmation of the bid price,
and discovered that the contractor's miscalculation was a bona fide error, it gave the contractor an opportunity to withdraw its bid but not to amend it. Id. A. Marvin Company responded that it would perform the contract for the originally submitted bid price, but it
subsequently defaulted. Id Ransom did not receive any correspondence concerning the bid
error. /L
202. Id. Ransom claimed that the breach occurred when the government failed to notify it
of Marvin's option to withdraw its bid.
203. Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title I, § 133, 96 Stat. 41 (1982) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1973 & Supp. V 1989)). The Tucker Act gives the Claims Court jurisdiction
over

any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1973 & Supp. V 1989). To determine if a claim is "founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," the
issue turns on "whether the source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as mandating
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained." See United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) (stating that with this inquiry, courts need not find separate waiver of sovereign immunity nor consent to be sued in express or implied contract with
United States because Tucker Act may provide consent). The Tucker Act further states that
for purposes of the Act, an express or implied contract with the Air Force Exchange Service
shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) (1989); see Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865, 870 (Cl. Ct. 1982) (stating
that for Tucker Act claim based on contract, contract must be between plaintiff and government and entitle plaintiff to money damages in event of government's breach of contract).
204. Ransom v. United States, 900 F.2d 242, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
205. Ransom v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 263, 272 (1989), aJ'd, 900 F.2d 242 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
206. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 243. The Claims Court originally dismissed the suit due to Ransom's failure to certify the claim. 17 Cl. Ct. 263, 266 n.1 (1989). On appeal, the Federal
Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. Ransom v. United States, 838 F.2d 1222, 1222
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
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firmed the Claims Court's summary judgment in favor of the government. 20 7 After examining the record below, the court concluded
that no authorized representative of the government ever said or
did anything that could be construed as intending to obligate the
government to Ransom. 20 8 Neither were any bonds or other docu-

ments ever signed by the government nor did any language within
the bonds themselves remotely indicate that the government was
bound to Ransom. 20 9 On that basis, the Federal Circuit found that

no express contract existed between Ransom and the
21 0
government.
In the alternative, Ransom argued that an implied-in-fact contract
was inferred from the parties' conduct. 2 1 ' The court concluded,
however, that Ransom failed to satisfy the standards for establishing
implied-in-fact contracts. 21 2 The most that could be implied from
the fact that the government requires contractors to provide bonds
is a duty between the contractor and the government. This duty,
2 13
however, does not extend to the surety.
Ransom cited Balboa Insurance Co. v. United States 2 14 to support its
claim that because the government contract required a bond, the
contract creates a third-party contract in which the government, the
contractor, and the surety have rights and obligations. 21 5 The
court, however, noted that the court in Balboa merely held that the
government becomes a "stakeholder" for remaining contract proceeds when the surety notifies the government that the surety's interest is in jeopardy due to the contractor's default. 21 6 Balboa's
holding was based on the rationale that once the surety notified the
207. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245; see Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1163
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing standard for summary judgment and stating that after moving
party has clearly established case, duty to go forward shifts to party opposing motion to produce evidence that places material facts in dispute and that if opposing party fails, summary
judgment must be granted to moving party).
208. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 244.
209. Id210. See id. (stating that express contract does not exist and none was intended).
211. Id Ransom argued that because the government required A. Marvin Company to
obtain bonds, a reciprocal contract between the government and Ransom should be implied.
Id (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (holding that
implied-in-fact contract is inferred from parties' conduct, and that legal consequences of express contract and implied-in-fact contract are similar)).
212. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245; see Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592,
597 (1923) (stating that implied-in-fact agreement is "founded upon a meeting of minds,
which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of
the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit
understanding").
213. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245.
214. 775 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
215. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245.
216. Id. (citing Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1160-63 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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government of the contractor's default, the surety could assert the
equitable doctrine of subrogation. 21 7 The Federal Circuit did not,
however, consider the subrogation issue, because Ransom did not
2 18
assert this doctrine as a basis for its cause of action.
The Federal Circuit also noted that Ransom misfocused on Balboa's language relating to the government's rights to sue on the
surety's bonds if the surety fails to perform. 21 9 The Balboa court
carefully qualified its statement in regard to a surety's rights in government contracts, stating that "under certain circumstances, a
surety could assert rights against the government" based on contract theory. 220 The Federal Circuit, in Ransom, defined the "certain
circumstances" under which the government could be contractually
bound to a surety: the government may be bound "if it manifested
such an intent." 2 2 1 The Federal Circuit held that neither an express
nor an implied contract existed between the government and Ransom and that, therefore, the government did not intend to be bound
2 22
to the surety.
The Federal Circuit was faced with some of these same issues in
Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. v. United States. 223 In Fireman'sFund, the
Federal Circuit also held that the surety did not have an express or
an implied-in-fact contract with the government because the surety
was neither the direct beneficiary nor the intended third-party beneficiary of any promise by the government. 2 24 The Federal Circuit
also held that although generally a surety is discharged from its obligations when an obligee departs from or alters the contractual provisions relating to payments or security of retained funds, the
government did not depart from the terms of the bonded contract
by releasing the full amount of retainage funds to the contractor
2 25
before the work was substantially complete.
Prior to beginning performance of a contract to build a pressure
recovery system for a high energy laser test facility of the United
217. See Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that traditional means of asserting surety's claim is under equitable doctrine of subrogation

entitling surety to succeed to contractual rights of contractor against government).
218. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245 (dismissing subrogation issue because surety did not give
notice of contractor's default to government).
219. Id;see Balboa Ins. Co., 775 F.2d at 1160 (stating that if surety fails to perform, government can sue under bond).
220.

Balboa Ins. Co., 775 F.2d at 1160.

221. Ransom, 900 F.2d at 245.
222. Id; see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 500 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(relying on Ransom and holding that government's requirement of payment and performance
bonds on contracts does not imply contract between government and surety).
223. 909 F.2d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
224. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 500 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
225. Id. at 497-98.
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States Department of the Army, the contractor, Westech Corporation, obtained both performance and payment bonds from Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. 2 26 The construction contract
provided that the government was to make periodic progress payments to Westech, but the government was to retain ten percent of
each payment. 22 7 If the contractor made satisfactory progress during a payment period, however, the government's contracting officer could authorize payment in full. 228 When Westech
experienced cash flow problems due to overtime expenditures, it
submitted a request for the release of retainage funds. 2 29 The con23 0
tracting officer agreed and released the funds.
Fireman's Fund, in refusing to assume the contract after Westech
defaulted, challenged the release, arguing that such an action was a
departure from the terms of the contract. 23 1 The Claims Court
agreed with Fireman's Fund and held that the surety was discharged
2 32
from its obligations under the pro tanto discharge rule.
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising three issues: (1) whether the pro tanto discharge rule applies to government
contracts; (2) whether the government owes a surety an equitable
duty when the surety has failed to notify the government that the
contractor has defaulted under the bond; and (3) whether the government owes the surety a contractual duty not to release the
retainage until after the contract is substantially complete. 233 The
Federal Circuit declined to address the first issue, stating that even if
the pro tanto discharge rule did apply, it would not relieve Fireman's
Fund of liability in this case. 23 4
226. Id. at 496.
227. Id
228. Id. Westech performed satisfactorily through the first 14 pay periods, during which
time the government retained 10%o of Westech's monthly payments. Id
229. Id.
230. Id At the time the request to release the retainage funds was made, the project was
approximately 85%o complete, and there was no indication that Westech would be unable to
complete the contract. Id.
231. Id. at 496-97 (observing that Fireman's Fund had fulfilled its obligations under bond
by satisfying over $2 million in subcontractor and supplier claims against Westech). Fireman's Fund, however, defaulted on its performance bond by declining to assume the contract,
alleging that the government's premature release of the retainage breached the bonded contract and prejudiced its interests. Id
232. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 225 (1988), rev'd, 909 F.2d 495
(Fed. Cir. 1990). The pro tanto discharge rule states that "if the obligee departed from or
altered the contractual provisions relating to payments and/or security or retained funds, a
surety is discharged to the extent it can show injury, loss, or prejudice." Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 15 Cl. Ct. at 230. The Claims Court noted its unprecedented use of the pro tanto discharge rule as it relates to government contracts. Id.
233. Fireman'sFund Ins. Co., 909 F.2d at 498-99.
234. Id at 497. In Fireman's Fund, the Federal Circuit focused more heavily on the contractual or equitable obligations of the government, relying on other circuit case law rather
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With respect to the second and third issues, the Federal Circuit
held that, assuming the pro tanto discharge rule applies, a surety is
discharged from its obligations when an obligee departs from or alters the contractual provisions relating to payments or the security
of retained funds. 23 5 The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with
the Claims Court's evidentiary interpretations."3 6
The Claims Court determined that the government had, in fact,
departed from the terms of the contract by releasing the funds early,
thereby discharging Fireman's Fund from its obligations. 2" 7 The
Federal Circuit, couching the issue in terms of a legal conclusion,
noted that the contract made no statement regarding what the contracting officer could do with the retainage after he accumulated it
but before the contract was substantially completed. 2 8s Therefore,
the court stated that under the terms of the contract, an early release of retainage funds was within the contracting officer's
23 9
rights.
The Federal Circuit also held that the government does not owe
an equitable duty to a surety unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond. 240 Notice, the
court emphasized, is the minimum requirement the surety owes the
government to establish a duty owed by the government. 2 4 1 Because Fireman's Fund did not notify the government of its principal's failure to pay its subcontractors, the government did not have
a duty to withhold disbursements of any retainage. 2 42 Moreover,
the court noted that a surety cannot rely on subcontractors to prothan on interpretative black letter rules. See id at 500 (noting that surety did not have express
or implied contract with government).
235. Id. at 497 (restating pro tanto discharge rule). Although the Federal Circuit stated
that it would not decide the issue of whether the pro tanto discharge rule applies to government contracts, it decided the case based on the assumption of its application, giving the
impression that the rule does apply to government contracts.
236. See id. (finding that Westech's performance during first 14 pay periods satisfactory
and that government could have chosen not to retain funds, contrary to trial court's assertion
that under contract, government lacked discretion to release funds).
237. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 15 CL. Ct. at 229.
238. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 909 F.2d at 498 (noting ambiguity concerning period of
time between government's retention of funds, and substantial completion of contract). The
court added that according to paragraph 7(c) of the construction contract, the government
could have chosen not to retain funds for any of the work that Westech performed satisfactorily. Id. The Federal Circuit agreed with the government's contention that the contract's
silence concerning the period of time between retainage and substantial completion should
not be interpreted to force results contrary to the terms of the construction contract. Id.
239. Id at 498 (noting that government has considerable latitude in administering its
contracts).
240. Id
241. Id.
242. Id. at 499. Fireman's Fund did not notify the government of Westech's failure to pay
its subcontractors and suppliers until almost five months after the government had fully released the retainage funds. Id.
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tect its interest. 24 3 Thus, a subcontractor's notification to the government of a contractor's failure to pay its subcontractors does not
trigger a duty on the part of the government to retain the funds. 244
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Fireman's Fund argument
that an implied-in-fact contract existed between it and the government. 2 45 Relying on Ransom v. United States,24 6 the court held that
the requirement for payment and performance bonds on contracts
does not imply a contract between the government and the
surety. 24 7 Furthermore, even if a contract, implied or otherwise,
could be fashioned, Fireman's Fund still could not prevail because a
release of the funds was not a departure from the contract. 248 The
opinion belies the Federal Circuit's opening statements that it
would not decide the issue of the pro tanto discharge rule's application to government contracts because the court decided the case on
the assumption that thepro tanto discharge rule applied. The court's
conclusion seems to extend the pro tanto discharge rule to government contracts regardless of its earlier statements.
VIII.
A.

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Terminationfor Convenience Clause

In Salsbury Industries v. United States, 2 49 the Federal Circuit held that
the government validly terminated its contract with a supplier based
on its determination that to do so was in the government's best
250
interest.
Salsbury Industries bid on a contract with the United States Postal
Service for the provision of aluminum lockboxes. 25 1 During the bid
period, the contracting officer disqualified another bidder, Doninger Metal Products Corporation, because it was not a responsible
243. Id.
244. See id, (stating that although some subcontractors and suppliers informed government of Westech's payment deficiencies, surety is not relieved of notice obligation and gov-

ernment's equitable duty toward surety is not triggered).
245. I at 500.
246. 900 F.2d 242 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see supra notes 198-222 and accompanying text (discussing Ransom v. United States).
247. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 909 F.2d at 500 (stating that Fireman's Fund was neither intended third-party, nor direct beneficiary of any promise by government within bonded contract, and as such, government did not undertake any obligation to Fireman's Fund).
248. Fireman'sFund Ins. Co., 909 F.2d at 500; see supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text
(noting that under terms of contract, contracting officer was within his rights to release
retainage funds early).
249. 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 671 (1991).
250. Salsbury Indus. v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
251. Id. at 1519.
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bidder. 252 The Postal Service awarded the contract to Salsbury and
four other companies. 25 3 After Salsbury began performance on the
contract, Doninger sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an injunction barring the continuation of performance based on the Postal Service's improper disqualification of
Doninger as a bidder. 254 The district court issued an injunction and
notified the contracting officer and parties to the suit.2 55 Upon noti-

fication, the contracting officer issued a stop work order and terminated for convenience the contract with Salsbury because of the
injunction and the officer's view that termination was in the government's best interests. 256
Salsbury appealed the contracting officer's action to the United
States Claims Court. 25 7 The Claims Court granted the Postal Service's motion for summary judgment holding that the government's
termination was proper and in the government's best interests. 258
Salsbury then appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit. 259
On appeal, Salsbury argued: (1) that the termination for convenience was improper because the contracting officer never made the
requisite finding that termination was in the government's best interest; and (2) that the termination by the Postal Service was improper because the Service acted illegally under the standards
announced in Torncello v. United States.2 60 The court, in a unanimous

opinion written by Judge Mayer, agreed with the Claims Court that
the actions of the contracting officer were in the best interests of the
government, since failure to terminate the contract would result in
criminal contempt sanctions. 261 The Federal Circuit stated that it
will not disturb a contracting officer's decision to terminate a con252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Doninger Metal Prods. v. United States, No. 83-2725 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1984). The

district court ordered the Postal Service "to suspend the performance of so much of the contracts awarded pursuant to [the] [s]olicitation... as would have been awarded to [Doninger]
... had [Doninger's] offer been accepted in full and award an aluminum door lockbox contract to [Doninger] in accordance with that offer." Id.
256. Salsbury Indus. v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
257. Salsbury Indus. v. United States, 17 CI. Ct. 47 (1989), aft'd, 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir.
1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 671 (1991).
258.
259.

Salsbury Indus., 17 CI. Ct. at 54.
Salsbury Indus., 905 F.2d at 1519.

260. Id. (citing Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 772 (Cl. Ct. 1982) (holding that
Navy could not terminate for convenience its contract with successful bidder where there was
no change from original circumstances of bargain or change in expectations of parties)).
261.

Salsbury Indus., 905 F.2d at 1520.
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tract absent "bad faith or clear abuse of discretion." 262 Because
neither bad faith nor abuse of discretion was apparent from the record, the court declined to question the decision to terminate the
263
contract.
Addressing Salsbury's second argument, the court held that
Torncello did not apply under the circumstances of this case. 2 64 In
Torncello, the Claims Court held that the government cannot hide
behind the termination for convenience clause in a contract when it
obligates itself to a party knowing that it cannot honor the contract. 2 65 In Salsbury Industries, however, the Federal Circuit noted
that the government unquestionably intended to honor its contract
with Salsbury. 26 6 The improper disqualification of another bidder
was found to be irrelevant to the government's intention or ability
to honor its contract with Salsbury. 2 67 In addition, the court stated
that the Postal Service honored its contract with Salsbury for more
than one year by paying over five million dollars for services before
the injunction issued. 268 The court added that the government's intention to honor its contractual obligations was made clear through
these actions, and therefore, under these circumstances, Torncello
did not apply. 2 69 The Federal Circuit, based on its affirmation that
it was in the government's best interest, concluded that the govern2 70
ment validly terminated its contract with Salsbury.
B. Ambiguity
The Federal Circuit decided three cases dealing with the recurring problem of ambiguous contracts. 2 7 1 In Fruin-Conlon Corp. v.
United States,2 72 the Federal Circuit held that a contractor must rely
on its own or on a subcontractor's interpretation of ambiguous contract provisions at the time of bidding, rather than at the time of
262. Id at 1521 (citingJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 442 (Ct. Cl.
1963)).
263. Salsbury Indus., 905 F.2d at 1521.
264. Id
265. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 757 (Ct. CI. 1982). The Federal Circuit in
Salsbury cited to this principle as "an unremarkable proposition." Salsbury Indus., 905 F.2d at
1521.
266. Salsbury Indus., 905 F.2d at 1521.
267. IL
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1522.
271. See infra notes 272-341 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity cases). For a
definition of an ambiguous contract, see Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d
701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining ambiguity as contract reasonably susceptible of more than
one interpretation).
272. 912 F.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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performance, to receive an equitable adjustment based on the interpretation of that provision. 273 Fruin-Conlon bid and entered into a
contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers to construct an addition to an existing government building. 274 The bid
included a subcontract to provide electrical work according to contract specifications. 275
The contractor submitted drawings, prepared by the subcontractor, to the government indicating the plan for the installation of wiring.276 The subcontractor had begun installation of the wiring when
the government notified Fruin-Conlon that the proposed installation was unacceptable. 277 The government required Fruin-Conlon
to remove and reinstall the wiring in accordance with the precise
language of the contract. 278
The contractor complied with the government's request and then
submitted a claim for an equitable adjustment to cover the costs of
reinstallation. 279 The contracting officer denied the claim and
Fruin-Conlon appealed to the ASBCA.280 The ASBCA denied
Fruin-Conlon's protest, but noted that "both parties' interpretations of the contract were reasonable and that the contract was thus
ambiguous." 28 ' Fruin-Conlon appealed the Board's decision to the
Federal Circuit. 282
The Federal Circuit declined to review the ASBCA's finding that
the contract terms were ambiguous because it constituted a finding
of fact.283 The court, however, did analyze Fruin-Conlon's conten-

tion that the ASBCA's holding, stating that it failed to rely on its
subcontractor's interpretation at the time of the bid, was clearly er273. Fruin-Conlon Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
274. Id. at 1427.
275. Id. at 1427-28.
276. Id. at 1428.
277. Id. The subcontractor's drawings differed from provisions of the National Electric
Code regarding the method of installation of wiring. Id. Three days after the subcontractor
began installation, the government orally informed Fruin-Conlon that the manner of installation was unacceptable. Id.Five days later, the government notified Fruin-Conlon of its disapproval in writing. Id Despite notification, Fruin-Conlon continued with the incorrect method
of installation for one month before it complied with the government's request. Id.
278. Id at 1427. The government rejected Fruin-Conlon's contention that the National
Electric Code definition only applies to safety considerations. Id.
279. Id at 1428. Fruin-Conlon sought an equitable adjustment of $186,349.21 to cover
the additional work involved in removing and replacing installed conduit wiring to comply
with the government's request. Id.
280. Fruin-Conlon Corp., ASBCA No. 30,702, 89-3 BCA (CCH) 1 22,005, 22,009 (1989),
aff'd, 912 F.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
281. Id. at 22,010 (1989).
282. Fruin-Conlon Corp., 912 F.2d at 1428.
283. Id at 1429; see supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Circuit
standard of review of agency boards' decisions).
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roneous as a matter of law. 28 4 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
28 5

ASBCA's decision.
The court held that reliance by a contractor or a subcontractor on
an interpretation of an ambiguous contract must be shown not dur28 6
ing the course of performing a contract but at the time of the bid.
2
87
The contractor bears the burden of proving this reliance
and, the
court observed, Fruin-Conlon failed to provide any evidence to the
ASBCA that it relied on its subcontractor's interpretation of the am288
biguous contract provisions at the time of its bid.

The Federal Circuit further stated that Fruin-Conlon's reliance on
Froeschle Sons, Inc. v. United States 28 9 as authority for reliance during
contract performance was erroneous. 2 90 The court observed that
although Froeschle held that an equitable adjustment could be
granted if the contractor proved that it reasonably relied on the
drawings or interpretations of its subcontractor, the reliance must
occur at the time of the bid.2 9 1 In Froeschle, the contractor incorporated the subcontractor's bid into its own bid to the government and
relied on the subcontractor's interpretation for pricing at the time of
bidding. 29 2 The court held that Fruin-Conlon did not present any
evidence indicating that it similarly relied on its electrical subcon2 93
tractor's interpretation or information at the time of bidding.
The Federal Circuit also distinguished WPC Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States,29 4 a Court of Claims case that held that reliance during
performance of a contract may be sufficient to establish the right to
284. Fruin-ConlonCorp., 912 F.2d at 1429. Fruin-Conlon argued that showing reliance on
an ambiguous contract provision during performance is sufficient to enable it to recover equitable adjustment. I
285. hd
286. Id at 1430 (quoting Lear Siegler Management Serv. Corp. v. United States, 867 F.2d
600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that contractor must prove reliance not merely in preparing bid, but in interpretation of ambiguous term)).
287.

Fruin-Conlon Corp., 912 F.2d at 1430.

288. Id.
289. 891 F.2d 270 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see Younger, supra note 10, at 1061-62 (discussing
Froeschle Sons, Inc.). In Froeschle Sons, Inc., one drawing called for one-inch and three-inch pip-

ing passing through certain valves, while a schedule to that drawing, as well as another drawing, incompatibly called for four-inch piping. Froeschle Sons, Inc. v. United States, 891 F.2d
270, 271 (Fed. Cir. 1989). After award of the contract, when it had already ordered the oneinch and three-inch piping, Froeschle raised the issue with the government, and was advised
that four-inch piping should be used throughout. Id. The Federal Circuit held that the record
showed that the subcontractor relied upon the presently claimed interpretation and that the
ASBCA erred in requiring the contractor to prove that it specifically included the subcontractor's bid in making its estimate. Id. at 272.
290. Fruin-Conlon, 912 F.2d at 1430.
291. Id.
292.

Froeschle Sons, Inc., 891 F.2d at 272-73.

293. Fruin-Conlon, 912 F.2d at 1430, 1432 (stating that Fruin-Conlon became aware of
ambiguous and disputed term during performance of contract).
294. 323 F.2d 874 (Cl. Ct. 1963).
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relief.29 5 The Federal Circuit noted that WPC Enterprises required a
contractor to prove reliance at the time of the bid unless the parties'
intentions under the contract were "otherwise affirmatively
stated." 29 6 In Fruin-Conlon, the government clearly and unambiguously rejected Fruin-Conlon's drawings and interpretations of the
installation of the wiring, yet the subcontractor continued to install
29 7
the wiring pursuant to its interpretation.
In Fruin-Conlon, the Federal Circuit focused on the importance of
presenting sufficient evidence of reliance on an interpretation of an
ambiguous contract at the board review level in order to establish a
case for an equitable adjustment. 2 98 Fruin-Conlon's appeal, therefore, was rejected not only because of defective legal reasoning, but
2 99
also because of insufficient provision of evidence.
The Federal Circuit, in R.B. Wright Construction Co. v. United
States,30 0 split in its decision and discussion of burdens and policies
behind federal government contracts.3 0 1 Writing for the two-to-one
majority, Senior Judge Friedman held that the standard omissions
and misdescriptions clause used in government contracts does not
allow the contractor to do less than the contract requires on the
grounds that such lesser work is customary in the trade.3 0 2 The
Federal Circuit found that the sole issue in the case was whether the
contractual requirement that three coats of paint be applied to certain surfaces contained an implied exception that only two coats are
295. Fruin-Conlon, 912 F.2d at 1430. In WPC Enters., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874 (Cl.
Ct. 1963), the government and contractor disagreed over whether the contract for the production of generators required certain parts to be manufactured by specific named companies. Id at 875-77. The Court of Claims found the government-drawn contract ambiguous
and the contractor's interpretation reasonable. Id. at 880. The court held that the government was required to affirmatively reveal its intention or be held to the contractor's reasonable interpretation. Id
296. Fruin-Conlon, 912 F.2d at 1430; see WPC Enters., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874
(CI. Ct. 1963) (determining that before awarding contract, government did present its interpretation of disputed term, but when contractor demurred, government did not sufficiently
insist on its announced requirement).
297. Fruin-Conlon, 912 F.2d at 1428. The Federal Circuit noted that even under the most
favorable view toward Fruin-Conlon, an adjustment could be made possibly for the three days
between Fruin-Conlon's submission of the drawings incorporating its interpretation of the
contract and notification by the government that such an interpretation was wrong. Id. at
1431. Such a recovery, however, cannot be permitted without sufficient evidence provided by
the contractor. Id
298. Id. at 1429-30.
299. Id. at 1432.
300. No. 90-1188 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file). This
opinion will be published at 919 F.2d 1569, but is not yet in print. It was previously published
and withdrawn.
301. R.B. Wright Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 90-1188, at 13 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file).
302. Id. at 6.

19911

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: 1990 SUMMARY

1151

required when the surface had already been painted.3 0 3 The court
held that there was no implied exception because the contract was
unambiguous in requiring three coats of paint.30 4 Judge Plager, in a
pointed dissent, discussed the nature of poorly drafted government
contracts and stated that the government should have the burden of
paying for any ambiguities or inarticulateness in its contract
drafting.3 0 5
R.B. Wright entered into three contracts with the government to
perform miscellaneous repairs and painting on approximately 200
World War II-era barracks and office buildings.3 0 6 Each of R.B.
Wright's contracts contained drawings specifying the areas to be
painted and detailing surface preparation, type of paint, and numbers of coats.3 0 7 R.B. Wright reviewed the drawings and began
30 8
work, through its subcontractor, Rembrant, on the facilities.
During the course of performance, the government discovered that
the subcontractor was applying only one coat of paint to the specified surfaces. 3 0 9 Based on its interpretation of the contract, the government ordered R.B. Wright to apply three coats of paint to the
already painted surfaces or to give the government credit for any
work not performed.3 1 0 Pursuant to R.B. Wright's request, Rembrant performed the work as directed and subsequently submitted
claims for extra cost to the contractor.3 11 R.B. Wright forwarded
the claims, with its own additional costs for overhead and profit, to
31 2
the contracting officer, who denied the claims.
R.B. Wright timely appealed the contracting officer's decision to
the ASBCA, arguing that the painting schedule applied only to previously unpainted surfaces.3 13 The ASBCA, in a four-to-one decision, denied the appeal, finding that the painting schedule applied
3 14
unambiguously to all surfaces, whether painted or unpainted.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that, although questions of
contract interpretation are questions of law and therefore reviewable de novo by the Federal Circuit, the ASBCA's expertise on ques303. Id.
304.

Id. at 6-7.

305. Id. at 17 (Plager, J., dissenting).
306.

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
112,351
file).

Id. at 2.

IE at 2-3 (setting forth example of detailed painting schedule contained in contract).
Id. at 4.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id. at 5.
R.B. Wright Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 31,967-69, 90-1 BCA (CCH) 22,364, at
(1989), aft'd, No. 90-1188 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit
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tions of government contracts requires the grant of "some weight to
the Board's interpretation of particular contractual language. 3 1 5

Applying this standard of review and examining the ASBCA's interpretation of the contract, the majority held that the contract was

unambiguous.a

16

According to the court, the contractor bore the burden of clarifying any questions relating to the contract prior to executing the contract.3 1 7 The record, Judge Friedman noted, did not indicate that
the contractor or the subcontractor questioned the government on

any ambiguity.3 18 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit imposed the
burden on the subcontractor and the prime contractor to bid on the

contract as written, not as interpreted or construed by a contractor
and not according to contrary customary trade practice. 319 The
court concluded that contractors' or subcontractors' interpretations

or customary trade practices cannot change unambiguous provisions of a contract.3 20

Judge Plager's dissent, however, indicated that the problem was
not one of legal interpretation, but "of common sense." 3 2 1The dissent argued that rather than adhering blindly to the perceived terms
of the contract, the contracting officer should have examined the

situation more closely.3 22 Moreover, Judge Plager stated, the government should not be able to avail itself of the contract's omissions
clause protection without allowing the contractor some similar

protection. 323

The Federal Circuit in Carl Garris & Son, Inc. v. United States,3 24 an
315. R.B. Wright Constr., No. 90-1188, at 6; see supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text
(explaining Federal Circuit standard of review of agency boards' decisions).
316. R.B. Wright Constr., No. 90-1188, at 6.
317. Id. at 8.
318. lId
319. Id. at 9-10.
320. It at 10 (citing Northwestern Indus. Piping, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1308,
1314 (Cl. Ct. 1972) (holding that trade practice will not override clear and unambiguous contract specifications)). The Federal Circuit also quoted the ASBCA's opinion that the government is "entitled to receive what it has paid for, even if it exceeds what is absolutely needed
for a satisfactory result." R.B. Wright Constr. Co., No. 90-1188, at 11.
321. R.B. Wright Constr., No. 90-1188, at 14 (Plager, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 15 (Plager, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 16. Judge Plager also stated:
By its approval of the Appeals Board's mechanical reading of the contract, the
majority creates a negative incentive for the Government to invest resources in getting its contracts right in the first instance, and diverts resources into contract performance which even the Government does not want, or which at best produces
marginal benefits compared to the costs incurred. I would hold enforcement of the
literal terms of this contract under these circumstances unconscionable and reverse
the decision for the Government. If the Government wants to dofoolish things, it should pay
for its foolishness.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
324. No. 90-1215 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file).
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unpublished decision, discussed the concept of patent contract ambiguity thoroughly, applying it to reverse a decision of the
ASBCA.3 25 This case is important because most government contracts are very long and complex, and therefore, the possibility of
finding an ambiguity, whether latent or patent, is very real.
Carl Garris challenged the contracting officer's denial of its claim
for extra roofing work it performed under a contract with the
Navy. 3 26 Under the terms of the contract, the contractor was required to repair and re-roof housing at designated naval weapons
stations. 32 7 The contractor disputed the government's interpretation that the contract required total re-roofing.3 28 On appeal from
the contracting officer's denial, the ASBCA concluded that both parties' interpretation of the contract was reasonable and, therefore,
the contract was patently ambiguous.3 29 In addition, the Board
placed the burden on the contractor to recognize the patent ambiguity. 3 30 Carl Garris appealed to the Federal Circuit which held that
the contract was not patently ambiguous and remanded the case to
33 1
the ASBCA for resolution of payment and claims issues.
Judge Clevenger, writing for an unanimous court, asserted that
the question of contract ambiguity was reviewable de novo as a question of law. 3 3 2 The court disagreed with the ASBCA's conclusion,
stating that patent ambiguity occurs where the internal inconsistency is blatant and significant, not subtle, hidden, or minor.3 33 Patent ambiguity, the court observed, cannot be generally defined but
must be assessed on an ad hoc basis looking to "what a reasonable
' '33 4
man would find to be patent and glaring.
The Federal Circuit then examined the record below, pointing
out extensive and conflicting testimony indicating that government
representatives did not know whether the contract was ambiguous
325. Carl Garris & Son, Inc. v. United States, No. 90-1215, at 1-2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Circuit file). See generally supra note 1 (stating that unpublished decisions of Federal Circuit are not controlling precedent).
326. id at 1.

327. Id.
328.

Id at 2.

329. Id at 2-3.
330. Ide
at 3.
331, Id. at 1-2.
332. Id. at 3; see supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text (examining Federal Circuit's
standard of review of agency boards' decisions).
333. Carl Garris & Son, Inc., No. 90-1215, at 3-4 (quoting S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United
States, 546 F.2d 367, 370 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding that government diagram was ambiguous
and requiring contractor to resolve ambiguity before submitting bid)).
334. Id. at 4 (quoting Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 1233, 1244 (Ct. C1. 1970)
(finding contractor's interpretation of ambiguous contract reasonable and requiring government to compensate contractor for additional work it imposed on contractor)).
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or confusing.3 3 5 Under the circumstances, the court stated, no patent ambiguity existed and the ASBCA erred as a matter of law.33 6
Of additional interest was Judge Clevenger's discussion of the
theory of contra proferentem.33 7 When the court finds no patent ambiguity, the reasonableness of the contractor's interpretation of the
contract is critical to determining whether the contra proferentem rule
applies.3 3 8 The court reviewed the contract language and determined that Carl Garris' interpretation fell within the requisite "zone
of reasonableness" and therefore Garris' interpretation should be
adopted.3 3 9 Judge Clevenger stated that the contractor's interpretation need not necessarily be preferable to the government's, it need
only be reasonable.3 40 Therefore, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case to the ASBCA to review Garris' case consistent with its
3 41
order.
Thus, in Fruin-Conlon, R.B. Wright Construction, and Carl Garris &
Son, the Federal Circuit strictly construed the concept of ambiguity
against contractors. In Fruin-Conlon, the court held that reliance on
an ambiguous contract must be shown not during the course of performance, but at the time of the bid. In R.B. Wright Construction, the
court held that contractors must bid according to the contract as
written and not as interpreted or construed by a contractor and not
according to customary trade practice. Finally, in Carl Garris & Son,
the court held that patent ambiguity occurs when the internal inconsistency is blatant and significant, not when it is subtle, hidden, or
minor.
CONCLUSION

The 1990 court year in federal procurement law did not provide
startling or unexpected changes in the field. Once again, the Federal Circuit moved toward a strict definition of its subject matter
jurisdiction and clarified two critical concepts-"frivolousness" and
"final decisions." The court held that a protest is "frivolous" if the
claim or appeal involves legal points that cannot be argued on their
335. Id at 4-7.
336. Id. at 7.
337. Id at 7-8 (quoting Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 860 F.2d 409, 414
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating contra preferentem rule means that contract is construed against its
drafter if interpretation advanced by non-drafter is reasonable)).
338. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d 647, 650 n. 11 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(finding portions of contract patently ambiguous and requiring contractor to inquire about
ambiguity in order to recover for work done beyond that required under contractor's interpretation of contract)).
339. Id. at 9.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 10.
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merits or whose disposition is obvious.3 42 The court defined a final
decision as one that adjudicates all claims and which determines
3 43
damages.
The Federal Circuit also continued to read statutory language
strictly, stating that it will not be construed contrary to its plain
meaning absent a clear and contrary intent in the legislative history.3 44 Similarly, in 1990, the court continued to accord full effect
to factual determinations of agency Boards of Contract Appeal,
while reviewing legal decisions on a de novo basis.3 45 The certainty
provided by these definitions and interpretations demonstrates the
Federal Circuit's continued penchant for bright line tests.3 46 This
trend will most likely continue through 1991.

342. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (defining "frivolous" claim).
343. See supra notes 59 & 88-89 and accompanying text (defining "final" decision).
344. See supra notes 49-50 & 109-14 and accompanying text (deferring to intent of
Congress).
345. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's standard
of review of agency boards' decisions).
346. While this Article was in production, the Federal Circuit decided Texas Instruments
v. United States, 922 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that government could not reopen
negotiations with contractor because final binding agreement was reached). The issue in
Texas Instruments was whether the Administrative Contracting Officer's (ACO) approval of a
price negotiation memorandum was a final binding decision. Id- at 814. The court held that
formal execution is not essential to a consummation of a contract. Id (concluding that absence of Standard Form 30 does not exclude possibility of final binding agreement having
been reached). The court held that the "law presumes that when an ACO acquainted with the
underlying facts signs an internal document ... that she has decided to express a definite
opinion on the merits of the claim .....
l The Federal Circuit found that the ACO's
signature on a price negotiation memorandum constitutes an authorized decision to approve
the negotiated price even though the Department of Defense has issued an internal directive
that limits the ACO's authority to reach agreements. Id at 15. See General Elec. Co. v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1215, 1221 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (holding that government could be bound by contracting officer's notations of concurrence on legal opinion rendered by staff). The court then
reviewed the facts and concluded that a final binding agreement was reached between the
government and Texas Instruments and that the agreement could not be revoked on the basis
of unsupported and unverified allegations concerning the design of the equipment. Id. at
815.

